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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MICHAEL SAMUEL WEAVER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900284-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant in a district 
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a 
first degree or capital felony. 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are provided in Addendum A: 
U.S. Const, amend. IV; 
Utah Const, art , 1, § 14; 
U.C.A. § 76-6-404 (1989); 
U.C.A. § 77-23-3 (1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court erred in denying Michael Weaver's 
motion to suppress under the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution? 
a. In its determination of probable cause, did the 
trial court err in approving the "Affidavit For Search Warrant" 
which contained conclusory statements and insufficient information? 
b. Should the affidavit have been rejected under a 
"totality-of-the-circumstances" analysis? 
2. Did the trial court erred in denying Michael Weaver's 
motion to suppress under Article If Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution? 
a. How would the issues presented under the Federal 
Constitution be resolved under the Utah Constitution? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellate courts will reverse a trial court's factual 
assessment underlying a decision to deny a suppression motion when 
"it clearly appears that the lower court was in error. Clear error 
is indicated when the trial court's factual assessment is against 
the clear weight of the evidence or it induces a firm conviction 
that a mistctke has been committed." State v. Droneburq, 781 P.2d 
1303, 1304 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On May 12, 1989, the Honorable Sheila McCleve signed a 
warrant authorizing the search of 1316 East 3900 South, See 
Addendum B. On March 15, 1990, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
considered Defendant/Appellant Michael Samuel Weaver's motion to 
suppress evidence seized during the search on the grounds that the 
warrant was invalid. Record [hereinafter referred to as "R"] at 
148; Transcript of March 15, 1990 Motion to Suppress Proceedings 
[hereinafter referred to as "MS"] at 2-32. Weaver's motion was 
denied following the proceeding and then renewed and rejected again 
at trial. Transcript of March 27 & 28, 1990 Trial Proceedings 
[hereinafter referred to as "T"] at 32. On March 28, 1990, a jury 
found Michael Weaver not guilty of Burglary, a third degree felony, 
(R 96), and guilty of Theft, a felony of the third degree, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1989). (R 95). On 
April 10, 1990, Judge Frederick sentenced Michael Weaver to zero to 
five years in the Utah State Prison, together with an oiler of 
restitution, a fine, and a recoupment fee. (R 123). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about May 7, 1989, "someone" burglarized "Dusty's 
Vans" and took property valued at over ; iiiit). See Detective Leslie 
Kent Powers' Affidavit For Search Warrant [hereinafter referred to 
as "Powers' Affidavit"j, page ? (attached as Addendum B). Two 
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witnesses, Jay and Linda Lawrence,1 "stated that they were awakened 
at 700 hours on May 7, 1989 by someone who was jumping back and 
forth over a fence between her residence (apartment) and Dusty's 
Vans." The witnesses described the suspect and later identified him 
as Michael Weaver. Powers' Affidavit, page 3. 
Michael Weaver resided at 1328 East 3900 South with his 
grandmother. He was then on "Intense Supervised Parole for 
Receiving Stolen Property and . . . supervised by Sally Powell fron 
the Department of Corrections." Powers' Affidavit, page 3. His 
mother resided nearby at 1316 East 3900 South. Powers' Affidavit, 
pages 1 & 3. 
Detective Powers interviewed "Ms. Powell who allege[d] that 
on May 11, 1989, Weaver made numerous trips (5-6) between the houses 
and in fact was at the house to be searched on the evening of 
May 10, 1989." Powers' Affidavit, page 3. Detective Powers then 
alleged, "through his experience and belief that Weaver, being on 
Intense Supervised Parole, would not keep stolen property at his 
primary residence knowing that such a place could and is routinely 
searched by Parole Officers." Powers' Affidavit, page 3. Because 
of the above-mentioned circumstances and Weaver's activity, Powers 
alleged, there was probable cause "to believe that the stolen 
property sought to be seized" was located at 1316 East 3900 South 
1
 Jay and Linda "Larance" are the same Jay and Linda 
"Lawrence" who witnessed the reported crime. Compare (T 34) with 
Addendum B. 
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(the residence of Michael Weaver's mother). Powers' Affidavit, 
page 3. 
Detective Powers recited the preceding facts in his 
affidavit and presented it to the Honorable Sheila McCleve on 
May 12, 1989. Judge McCleve signed the warrant authorizing a search 
of the 1316 East 3900 South residence. At approximately 1:16 p.m., 
May 12, 1989, Detective Powers and various members of Adult 
Probation and Parole [AP&P] searched Michael Weaver's residence and 
his mother's residence for evidence of the reported crime. Evidence 
believed to have been stolen from Dusty's Vans was found in a 
storage shed located beside 1316 East 3900 South. The police 
confiscated the evidence found in the shed and one item, a 
television, found in the mother's home. (MS 9, 14). 
On March 15, 1990, during a Motion to Suppress proceeding 
before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Michael Weaver moved to 
suppress the evidence seized by the State. (R 148) ; (MS 2-32). 
Michael Weaver established that he had received permission to use 
his mother's home and her storage shed. (MS 20). Weaver placed a 
lock on the shed door and was only one of two people who possessed a 
key for the lock. (MS 21-22). Michael Weaver argued that the 
"Affidavit For Search Warrant" was not supported by "probable 
cause." The Court denied his motion following the proceeding and 
then again when Weaver renewed his objection at trial. (T 32). 
At trial Jay and Linda Lawrence testified that on the 
morning of May 7, 1989, they awoke to the sounds of "the clanking of 
the fence." (T 43). They looked out of their window and observed 
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"this guy jumping over a fence, throwing things over • . ." 
(T 35). Jay Lawrence yelled, "Hey, what's going on over there?" 
(T 35, 45). The "guy," Michael Weaver, "walked up to [their] lawr, 
. . . came up to [their] window, and attempted to explain his 
conduct. (T 35, 45). Jay Lawrence then saw Weaver get into his 
truck and drive out of the apartment parking lot. (T 38). The 
Lawrences told the police,2 including Detective Powers, what they 
had observed. (T 46, 47, 50, 55). 
While denying any participation in the burglary, Weaver 
acknowledged that he did "come into possession of certain items frcm 
that burglary." (T 32, 96). The jury found Michael Weaver "guilty" 
of Theft, and "not guilty" of Burglary. (R 95-96). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The affidavit used in support of the search warrant was 
invalid. Acting on nothing more than a "hunch," the police simply 
concluded that since Michael Weaver may have been involved in a 
burglary, he may have also kept property in his house or in his 
mother's house. The police knew that they could search the house oi 
Michael Weaver, a parolee, at any time. But in order to "justify" 
the search of his mother's house, the police attempted to form a 
nexus between the two residences based solely on an "allegation" 
which stated that four days after the burglary, "Weaver made 
numerous trips (5-6)" to his mother's house. The allegation did not 
2
 See infra note 8. 
state improper conduct, especially due to the close proximity of the 
two residences, the familial relationship involved, and the lapse of 
time which had expired. The affidavit also lacked a "substantial 
basis" for crediting the hearsay and for the conclusion reached by 
the affiant. Under the federal "totality of the circumstances" 
analysis, the court erred in finding that probable cause existed. 
Under the Utah Constitution, the court similarly erred 
because the "veracity" and "basis of the knowledge" requirements 
were not fulfilled. There was no indication that the allegation of 
the hearsay informant, a parole officer, was based on personal 
knowledge, or that the allegation was corroborated by other sources, 
or that it was reliable. The "totality of the circumstances" 
analysis should not be followed. 
Pursuant to either analysis, the probable cause necessary 
for an arrest is different than the probable cause required for a 
search. Probable cause does not exist for the search of each and 
every residence that a "suspect" happens to visit. The illegally 




NO PROBABLE CAUSE SUPPORTED THE ISSUANCE OF THE 
SEARCH WARRANT UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution 
states in relevant part: "no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized." U.S. Const, amend. IV. The language and interpretation cf 
the fourth amendment governs the arguments initially presented by 
Defendant/Appellant Michael Samuel Weaver. As revealed below, the 
court should not have issued a search warrant based upon the 
affidavit submitted by the investigating officer. The affidavit dii 
not contain sufficient information for a determination of "probable 
cause," and alleged nothing more than conclusions. 
In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the United 
States Supreme Court held that the "probable cause" requirement 
would be determined under a "totality of the circumstances" 
analysis. "The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a 
practical, common sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the 
'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay 
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence 
of a crime will be found in a particular place." Gates, 462 U.S. 
at 238. Though seemingly broad, the Court narrowed the application 
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of the "totality of the circumstances" standard just one year later 
in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
The Leon Court acknowledged the deference usually accorded 
the issuing magistrate's determination but specifically added: 
Deference to the magistrate, however, is not 
boundless . . . [R]eviewing courts will not defer to 
a warrant based on an affidavit that does not 
"provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for 
determining the existence of probable cause." 
"Sufficient information must be presented to the 
magistrate to allow that official to determine 
probable cause; his action cannot be a mere 
ratification of the bare conclusions of others." 
Even if the warrant application was supported 
by more than a "bare bones" affidavit, a reviewing 
court may properly conclude that, notwithstanding 
the deference that magistrates deserve, the warrant 
was invalid because the magistrate's probable cause 
determination reflected an improper analysis of the 
totality of the circumstances, or because the form 
of the warrant was improper in some respect. 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 914-15 (citations omitted). 
In the case at bar, the "Affidavit For Search Warrant" 
submitted by Detective Leslie Kent Powers summarized the findings of 
a recent burglary investigation.3 Detective Powers interviewed two 
witnesses, Jay and Linda Lawrence, who described the suspect and 
later identified him as Michael Weaver. The affidavit also stated: 
Weaver is currently on intense supervised 
parole for receiving stolen property and is 
supervised by Sally Powell from the Department of 
Corrections. Weaver resides at 1328 East 3900 South 
with his grandmother. Weaver's mother [Carol 
Ahlstrom] resides at the house to be searched [1316 
East 3900 South]. 
3
 See infra note 8. 
Affiant has interviewed Ms. Powell who alleges 
that on May 11, 1989, Weaver made numerous trips 
(5-6) between the houses and in fact was at the 
house to be searched on the evening of May 10, 1989. 
Affiant alleges through his experience and 
belief that Weaver, being on intense supervised 
parole, would not keep stolen property at his 
primary residence knowing that such a place could 
and is routinely searched by parole officers. 
Further, affiant alleges that there is probable 
cause, because of the above-mentioned circumstances 
and Weaver's activity, to believe that the stolen 
property sought to be seized is located at the 
property to be searched hereby. 
See Addendum B. 
Initially, a distinction should be made between the 
probable cause necessary to arrest an individual and the probable 
cause necessary to search an individual's house. 
The fact that there is probable cause to believe 
that a person has committed a crime does not 
automatically give the police probable cause to 
search his house for evidence of that crime. If 
that were so, there would be no reason to 
distinguish search warrants from arrest warrants, 
and cases like Chimel v. California . . . would make 
little sense. We have consistently held that facts 
must exist in the affidavit which establish a nexus 
between the house to be searched and the evidence 
sought . . . However, that nexus may be established 
either through direct observation or through normal 
inferences as to where the articles sought would be 
located. 
United States v. Vastola. 670 F.Supp. 1244, 1271 (D.N.J. 1987) 
(citations omitted). 
The sole "fact" which "established" a nexus between the 
house to be searched and the evidence sought was Ms. Powell's 
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allegation4 Weaver made numerous trips (b-ti) 
between the houses and house to be searched on 
the fvenir:; 01 *Wj _,, •* ' ewers' ^I'lda-iif pi<j> '. .Addendum B. 
THE ALLEGATION DID NOT PROVIDE THE COURT WITH A 
SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE 
OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
The "nexus*"1 jeaaniu Detective Powers to believe that 
Michael Weaver had placed stolen prop* mother's house was 
J . j ^ Sally Powell. Ms. Powell t 
though, was just * Weaver did -?*>** 
these "trips lid numerous othe* e inform 
Mcs. personally observe their 
formants made the v st^-:e du: * present 
"a substantial basis for crediting the v -, . ~>..'±L... United 
States, if,.1, U i'-i'' i J :n o i , If Ms, Powell had personal knowledge 
of these "trips," there wai.-. m» mji'poi t i vo evidence to corroborate 
het story and no proof that she had previously pn vidod Detective 
Powers with rt.vi nformation. But cf. Jones v. United States, 
3 62 U.S. 2b MIU) (hearsay i supporting the issuance of 
a warrant was proper when the informant's report was based «»n the 
informant's personal knowledge, the informant had previously 
1
 Other facts did exist which could have led Detective 
Powers to believe that Michael Weaver would not have kept "stolen 
property at his primary residence," but no other facts 
existed—other than the allegation of Ms. Powell—which would have 
led the detective to believe that Weaver kept the property at his 
mother's house. 
- 1 ] -
provided accurate information, and the informant's story was 
corroborated by other sources). 
Moreover, Ms. Powell's allegation revealed entirely 
innocent behavior. Michael Weaver lived at 1328 East 3900 South. 
His mother, Carol Ahlstrom, lived at 1316 East 3900 South.5 Powers' 
Affidavit, pages 1 & 3; Addendum B. Making "numerous trips" between 
the two houses was not criminal conduct, nor was it even improper 
conduct. The two houses were in close proximity to one another and 
there was a familial relationship involved. Michael Weaver 
frequently visited his mother's home, often using her washer and 
telephone. (MS 20). An individual on "Intense Supervised 
Probation," like Michael Weaver, could properly leave his home for 
extended periods of time and nothing precluded him from visicing his 
mother.6 See (T 69). The State even acknowledged that "he had a 
right to be there." (MS 30). 
5
 Michael Weaver's standing for the search was well 
established during the Motion to Suppress and at trial. He had 
received permission to use his mother's home and her storage shed. 
(MS 20). His expectation of privacy was evident to others through 
the lock which he placed on the door. (MS 21). He was only one of 
two people who possessed a key for the lock. (MS 21-22). 
Individuals outside the family could not gain access to the shed. 
The officers opened the lock after obtaining the key from Weaver. 
(T 9). Cf. Minnesota v. Olson, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990). 
6
 As a parolee on "Intense Supervision," Michael Weaver 
had either a 7:00 p.m. curfew, at which time he was required to be 
at his residence and then remain there until 6:00 a.m. the next 
morning; or a 9:00 p.m. curfew with a 6:00 a.m. check out time. 
(T 68, 69, 75). In either situation, there would be nothing unusual 
about him visiting his mother's residence five or six times on 
May 11, 1989. The fact that he was at his mother's house the night 
before, May 10, 1989, supports the frequency of his visits. 
Moreover, as his trial testimony revealed, his "numerous trips" were 
completely innocent. (T 103). 
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The situdf i OP li-i'f'y have been different If the houses were 
far apart, «,»!' i' i "mother/son" i e. I fit mnsh • r irl i.ot exist
 f or even 
:i f Mi hwll. alleged tha1" Weaver had in laci can K M inipurVv or 
"fruits t the crun<-M i n» =e residence to 1 lie othei „ Hone of 
these circumstances existed, howeve iiui^ ll merely alleged 
"that <m H ,y II 1989, Weaver made numerous trips (l"-bj betw»"Mi the 
houses ' Addendi lm 
Also absent from the allegat 
compara ement often, average, Michael Weav 
"frequented" his mother' visits were frequer* a 
next is could not have • r established through ; - -<r xmaL 
behavior- * ck1 ««,), IVJ Powell's allegation did } indicate I he 
time period involved for Michael W»?avrr' "numerous trips,11 Were 
his visits consistent with "meal hours" .- • . * "w.'ish and dry 
cycle" for a " - • aundry? Regardless of the numbei of 
trips \-ii the * .me interval deged, Mi chat1! Weaver's "activity"1 was 
not inconsistent with his "parolee" program restr ict i MII^ See 
(T 69) The dilegatj nil was "so lacking in indicia of probable cause 
as to render official belief .in its existence 
untuds State v, Droneburq, 781 P.2d 1303, 1 304 .nii-at. /i)ip, 
1989) (citations omitted). 
7 «jiie "good faith" exception of United States v. Leon, 4u? 
U.S. 897 (1984), which the State was required to prove, would not 
apply because of the unreasonable belief that probable cause 
existed. No nexus was established for a search of the Ahlstrom 
residence based upon the "numberous trips" made by Michael Weaver. 
See State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987); State v. Droneburq, 
701 D ?ri 1303, 1304 (Utah App. 1989). 
Even though Ms. Powell was an officer from the Department 
of Corrections, her allegation was, at best, an unsupported "belief" 
or "conclusion." Cf. Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 508, 313 A.2d 
847 (1974) ("Even assuming 'credibility' amounting to sainthood, the 
judge still may not accept the bare conclusion . . . of a sworn ard 
known and trusted police-affiant"). Her allegation, lacking 
"sufficient information" to support a determination of probable 
cause, could not have justified the issuance of a search warrant. 
If Ms. Powell's allegation was defective, Detective Powers' 
affidavit should not have been relied upon to search the premises. 
Detective Powers could not have had probable cause for the search 
without receiving "direction" from Ms. Powell. 
Alternatively, Detective Powers cannot circumvent the 
warrant requirement by assuming the role of a magistrate and 
concluding that Ms. Powell's allegation was sufficient. "[A] searci 
and seizure warrant shall issue only when the court—not the 
affiant, nor any one apart from the court—shall have found that 
there is probable cause to believe that the property described is 
unlawfully in the possession of any person." Allen v. Trueman, 100 
Utah 36, 110 P.2d 355, 359 (1941); Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-3 (1989) 
("no search warrant shall issue except upon a finding by the 
magistrate"). Otherwise, magistrates could accept, without 
question, one officer's statement because it was based upm another 
officer's conclusion: 
A police officer who arrived at the "suspicion," 
"belief" or "mere conclusion" that [contraband was] 
in someone's possession could not obtain a warrant. 
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But he could convey u n a conclusion another 
police officer, who could then secure the warrant by 
swearing that he had "received reliable information 
from a credible person" that the [contraband was] in 
someone's possession. 
Illinois v. Gates, 41»,- 11 i; *w o ,*. ~
 xBrennan "*" dissenting) 
(citations omitted). 
Suspect n>'",f Michael Weaver as a participant , 
Detective Powers arrived nclusion that merchandise may 
IK in the Weaver residenc* mothei ^idence 
Powers kne residence could be searchec 
v_J . "requested *** ? t:„.e search 
, ' , - - , * ilin * ,- L'O * ' o ^i4at 
merchandise \i . usty's Vans .*• < : ^ .} 
residence." (T 55). Ms. Powell mini mod powers that Weaver 
"! i'*equi:jiit.ed h is mother';? residence, which was o 111 \" . . . 40 or 5»> 
yards from where Lng. He lived * duplex, . and she 
lived in ihf tR xt duplex dowr *uented her residence, and 
I : l)et»ji,4. ivp t\ wer *; wanted to obtai search warr. • <c out 
that residence for stolen items,11 Powers then 
adopted Ms. Powell's allegation to suppnu i»m iclusory hunch. 
short, Detect3 vf- Powers did not adhere f; i. in I-IK- ' '-at. 
an officer must "pro fistrate with a substantial basis for 
determining the existence probable 
91b (quoting ...... .. • • * establ.i «- t^: 
a warrant cannot issue . .* strength conclusory 
tement that gives the magistrate . . --
making a judgment rpqarding probable cause,'" State v. Babbell 
- 15 -
P.2d 987if 992 (Utah 1989) (citing Illinois v, Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 
239 (1983)). 
The fourth amendment requires that when a 
search warrant is issued on the basis of an 
affidavit, that affidavit must contain specific 
facts sufficient to support a determination by a 
neutral magistrate that probable cause exists. The 
action of the magistrate, however, must not be "a 
mere ratification of the bare conclusions of 
others." Otherwise, the magistrate becomes only a 
"rubber stamp" for police, abandoning the neutral 
and detached role which is "a more reliable 
safeguard against improper searches than the hurried 
judgment of a law enforcement officer." 
Thus, "reviewing courts will not defer to a 
warrant based on an affidavit that does not 'provide 
the magistrate with a substantial basis for 
determining the existence of probable cause.'" Even 
a search warrant obtained under an officer's 
"objectively reasonable reliance," i.e., "good 
faith," cannot be validated if it is clear that the 
warrant is based on an affidavit "so lacking in 
indicia of probable cause as to render official 
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." 
State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Utah App. 1989) (citations 
omitted). Ms. Powell's allegation and Detective Powers' adoption o:: 
her statement did not provide the magistrate with a sufficient basis 
for determining the existence of probable cause. The warrant was 
invalid. 
B. THE "TOTALITY-OF-APPELLANT'S-CIRCUMSTANCES" 
WOULD HAVE PRECLUDED A FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
Assuming, arguendo, that the information stated in Ms. 
Powell's allegation was not insufficient, or that it was not 
conclusory, or that Michael Weaver's "numerous trips11 were not 
innocent, the court still erred in making an improper analysis of 
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the "totality .-i i tw < • i rcumstances." United States v. Leon, 4un 
U.S. 897, 915 (1984). Detective r<wrs alleged, "through his 
expei ipnce «» • belief that Weaver, being lervised 
Parole, wot * property .* irimary residence 
knowing that such a place could nil i« itinely searched by Parole 
lilliceit, if Powers' Affidavit, page 3. Having air* -r-e. :ed 
Weaver as a partic i pani in- 1 hv at imii and inferring that Weaver 
carried the "fruits of tin.- crime" irom hi,< residence .* mother's 
residence, Detective Powers alleged that the stol ei , ± 
located at 1)1 d. tvisi I'nni .'....uid, See Powers' Affidavit, page 4. 
A common sense determination, I \,MUU!- , would have revealed a 
cont t Michael Weaver suspect on ,l" i nl ffiisi 
Supervised Parole t'hsnj" .•"! " "in -: \ -\ mci Lu-cla 
Lawrence. Powers' Affidavi suspect on 
"Intense . * • . Parole" who was confronted • * witnesses* <mcl 
8
 Ii i his affidavit, Detective Powers admitted reviewing 
the initial report of Deputy Gary Cummings and the follow-up report 
of Deputy Sterner. Yet, he conveniently omitted the following 
material facts from his affidavit. Deputy Sterner reported that 
when Mr. Lawrence awoke, he "witnessed the man jumping the fence. 
Mr. [Lawrence] yelled from his window, 'Hey, what are you doing?' 
The man . . . stated, 'Why, you got a problem?'" See Report 
#89-42191 (Follow-up report by Deputy Sterner). At trial, the 
Lawrences testified that Michael Weaver actually came up to their 
window to explain what he was doing (T 45). 
Another fact reported by Deputy Sterner, but omitted by 
Detective Powers, concerned the "fieldcarding" of Michael Weaver on 
May 7, 1989. See Report #89-42191 (Follow-up report by Deputy 
Sterner). In addition, Detective Powers should not have led the 
court to believe that there was only one individual involved in the 
burglary who may have attempted to dispose of the property. Powers7 
Affidavit, pages 2 & 3. Deputy Cummings reported that "Unknown 
(continued) 
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subjected to random searches of his house would not have waited for 
four full days before deciding to dispose of the property. See 
(T 103). Under the circumstances, four days was an excessive length 
of time. 
Moreover, if Weaver did not think that the witnesses could 
have identified him, his voice, or the truck he drove off in, 
cf. (T 103), he certainly would have realized that the police were 
"on his trail" when an officer pulled him over for nothing more than 
a "fieldcard" stop. At approximately 5:30 p.m., the day of the 
robbery, an officer pulled Weaver over to take down his name, his 
address, and his driver's license. See supra note 8. 
Given the circumstances—a positive identification of 
Michael Weaver as a suspect in a crime; the fact that his "status" 
(footnote 8 continued) 
person/s" burglarized "Dusty's Vans." See Report #89-42191 (InitiaL 
report by Deputy Cummings). As the jury later determined, other 
individuals were involved who could have disposed of the property. 
See (R 95-96); (T 99). 
Had all the pertinent information been presented to the 
court, it may not have authorized the search warrant. "[T]he 
deference accorded a magistrate's finding of probable cause does not 
preclude inquiry into the knowing or reckless falsity of the 
affidavit on which that determination was based." United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1983) (construing Franks v. Delaware, 438 
U.S. 154 (1978); State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986) 
("the affidavit must be evaluated to determine if it will support a 
finding of probable cause when the omitted information is 
inserted"). Nevertheless, the court still should have recognized 
the incongruity between Detective Powers' conclusion and his 
statements in "support" of his request. The totality of the 
circumstances summarized in the last paragraph before Point II, see 
supra pages 18-19, were all presented or known to the magistrate. 
They did not provide a substantial basis for a finding of probable 
cause. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). 
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subjected his house;? ti« rvintloii! searches; the four ^,>T lapse between 
the commission of the crime and rips"; the close 
pr ox i in i t v t'»l the * two houses; the familial relations!! I p i nv < » 1 v u -J, a 
the conclusory unsubstantiated allegatior •; v *;*- Powell—the court 
erred in determining that probable * , • Detecti e 
Powers ned the court, Michael Weaver would not - n 
property at his primary reside net' knowing that sue: place could 
i xt> routinely searched by Parole Off ice IT " court should 
have recogni Detective Powers' conclusion contradict.t*1 I N S 
reasoning. 
POINT II 
NO PROBABLE CAUSE SUPPORTED THE ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH 
WARRANT UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
lf[B]ecause of the similarity b e t w ^ n article section 1 4 
o Constitution and the fourth amendment <« niied 
States Constit,nt ititi, ( l,Iic» \)[f\h Supreme Court has] not - che past 
drawn , distinctions between i respectively afforded 
by l S-ita.te._-.:. Larocco, : : - (Utah 1990) 
State v. Watts, 7 ida ±^ Nevertheless, the Court: 
~^  no means ruled out the possibility of doing so in 
some future case since choosing to give the Utah 
Constitution a somewhat different construction may 
prove to be an appropriate method for insulating 
this state's citizens from the vagaries of 
inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth 
amendment by the federal courts. 
Larocco. " (citing Watts, 7 5 M F.7d at ??^i n.8). 
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The Larocco Court noted that "[t]he United States Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the fourth amendment, especially in the 
context of automobile searches, has been the source of much 
confusion among judges, lawyers, and police." Larocco, 135 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 21. After citing various problems with the federal 
analysis, the Larocco Court attempted to simplify "the search and 
seizure rules so that they can be more easily followed by the police 
and the courts . . . ." Id. at 23. If an expectation of privacy Is 
shown, the Court held, article I, section 14 applies. Warrantless 
searches will then be permitted only where, after the State has 
proven the existence of both probable cause and exigent 
circumstance, such a search will "protect the safety of police or 
the public or . . . the destruction of evidence." Id. at 23-24. 
Problems also exist with the federal analysis of "probable 
cause." See generally Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 274-91 
(1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In 1983, the Gates Court 
announced that it would abandon the "two-pronged" test ("veracity" 
and "basis of knowledge") of Aauilar v. Texas. 378 U.S. 108 (1964), 
and Spinelli v. United States. 393 U.S. 410 (1969), in favor of a 
"totality-of-the circumstances" analysis.9 Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. 
9
 By abandoning the "two-pronged" test from Aguilar and 
Spinelli. the Gates Court was in fact abandoning well established 
caselaw. The "Court has developed over the last half a century a 
set of coherent rules governing a magistrate's consideration of a 
warrant application and the showing that is necessary to support a 
finding of probable cause." Gates, 462 U.S. at 275 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). In apparent disregard of these standards, the Gates 
Court also ignored a "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" requirement 
recognized previously in Utah. 
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Jnder this analysis " "lef iciency • * **• prong] may be compensated 
for, r determining the overa .> .-> • . trong 
s ;•  the other, or i2 s\.v* t :,*, r *.. , 
Gates, 462 
however, the a handful of exceptions 
to ir'Vr1 * /arrant even though they were all single f rioter 
determinations. Leon, The exceptions permitted 
an evisceration i v . ^totality analysis. . n 
the one • invalidated because , • ..• :- i 
"knowin< reckless : : f ° i "an affidavit 
art : - 'provide the magistrate witn basis fr 
determinii «)« * probable causf t - , , 
-ire not enough) , United States . . ^v--- * " * * •' * * -^* 
«' <•" J t at j ons omitted) J.\* ' l f ** * f >- K 
nonexistence c t consideration should not invalidate * 
warrant under -.*•: "totality dances11 analysis. Gates, 
• <• \. clarify these principJ vt,, , ''' di 
adjustment shouia ;"«-;• umsh »ii • onformity with principles recognized 
previously in Utah. 
Long before Aguilar and Spinelli, the Utah Supreme Cour t 
held that well presci iuol .standards should guide the issuing 
xu
 jyiicnciejL Weaver respectfully requests this court to 
consider his analysis of the probable cause determination under 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution for the reasons 
stated or for any other reason deemed appropriate by this Court. 
In the past, Utah's appellate courts have seemed to express a 
willingness to consider alternative approaches under the Utah 
Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d no'* )4t 
n.l (Utah App. 1989). 
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magistrate's determination of what is or is not an unreasonable 
search or seizure. City of Price v. Jaynes, 113 Utah 89, 191 P.2i 
606 (1948) . A magistrate should not be able to consider the 
totality of the circumstances. See id. 
In Jaynes, three defendants were convicted of violating £n 
ordinance of the City of Price. The ordinance provided in pertinent 
part: 
The right of the people of the City of Price, County 
of Carbon, State of Utah, to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated. 
Price City Ordinance No. 1050 reprinted in Jaynes, 191 P.2d at 607, 
After noting the similarities between the United States Constitution 
and the Price City Ordinance, the Jaynes Court stated: 
We are not furnished with any guides as to what are 
reasonable or unreasonable searches and seizures. 
No answer is it to say that the magistrate who hears 
a charge under the ordinance may consult the 
statutes and the decisions in the files of American 
law and by that exploration delineate the area of 
reasonable from the area of unreasonable searches 
and seizures. This would put an intolerable if not 
an impossible burden on the magistrate. 
191 P.2d at 608. 
While the Price City Ordinance did not contain the clause 
of the Fourth Amendment which states, "no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized," the Jaynes Court did recognize that this 
clause: 
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proceeds to set out the preliminary steps necessary 
to a lawful search of a dwelling house or a 
structure. But the general protection given by the 
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search and 
seizure did not prevent other and different 
conditions as a prereguisite of search or of seizure 
in respect to different laws designed to accomplish 
a social or governmental purpose. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The Court added that the ordinance expressed only "an 
existing right and a declared policy. It does not set out with 
sufficient definiteness the act or acts prohibited or denounced." 
Id. Concluding that "[t]he acts condemned as unreasonable searches 
and seizures are nowhere defined in reference to the results 
necessary to be accomplished," the Court reasoned: 
Evidently the test of what is an unreasonable search 
or seizure is left to standards not prescribed in 
the ordinance of Price City but to the exploration 
in fields of law which prescribe such standards for 
the state of Utah or the other states. This leaves 
the tests too much in the air and dependent in each 
case on what the magistrate hearing the case may 
within the light of his very limited or plenary 
knowledge conclude to be reasonable or unreasonable. 
Id. at 609 (emphasis added). 
The Jaynes Court thus expressed a willingness to consider 
"the general protection given by the Fourth Amendment against 
unreasonable search and seizure," but, because a magistrate should 
not be left with an unprescribed test "too much in the air," the 
Court allowed "other and different" protections to serve as a 
"prerequisite of search or of seizure." Hence, a single factor may 
serve as a necessary protection for a lawful search and seizure. 
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Though the exact words were not used, the Jay^es decision rejected a 
"totality-of-the-circumstances" analysis. 
The search and seizure prerequisites were established, in 
part, by the decisions of Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 Utah 471, 93 P.2d 
920 (1939), and Allen v. Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 135 P.2d 242 
(1943). In Lindbeck, the Utah Supreme Court considered whether 
"'probable cause' [was] satisfied by an oath that one 'has reason to 
believe and does believe[.]'" Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 Utah 471, 93 
P.2d 920 (1939). Initially citing with approval "the general rule 
that probable cause is not shown by an affidavit on information an<i 
belief which does not state the facts showing the grounds of the 
belief," the Lindbeck Court subsequently held, "in line with the 
overwhelming weight of authority in the federal and state court, 
that such an affidavit [based only on reason and belief] does not 
meet the constitutional requirements . . • ." Id. at 923. 
Four years later, in Allen v. Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 135 
P.2d 242 (1943), the Court reaffirmed its holding of Lindbeck and 
specifically questioned the conclusory statements alleged by the 
affiant. According to the Court, the affiant's conclusory 
statements had "no facts being set forth upon which a complaint for 
perjury could be predicated if falsely given . . . The affidavit 
does not show probable cause to exist for the issuance of a search 
and seizure warrant under the general laws and the Constitution of 
the State of Utah." Holbrook, 135 P.2d at 247. 
In fact, the Holbrook Court expressly discounted the 
alleged prior criminal record of the defendant and his alleged 
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"continuing" criminal activity in its determination of probable 
cause: 
the affidavit must set forth facts sufficient to 
cause a discreet and prudent man to believe that the 
accused had the property sought to be seized. The 
fact that the affiant says he has that belief, in 
and of itself, is not sufficient to make probable 
cause. Furthermore, the allegation in the affidavit 
that said defendant has twice during the past three 
months been arrested and convicted for the illegal 
use of said bottles, and that he refused to refrain 
from using them is not sufficient to make probable 
cause as contemplated by the general statute or the 
Constitution. The affidavit in this case further 
sets forth that defendant now freely admits that he 
is continuing the use thereof. This is a mere 
conclusion of the affiant; no facts being set forth 
upon which a complaint for perjury could be 
predicated if falsely given. The substance of the 
admission is not given nor is the person named to 
whom the purported admission was made. The 
affidavit does not show probable cause to exist for 
the issuance of a search and seizure warrant under 
the general laws and the Constitution of the State 
of Utah. 
Holbrgok, 135 P.2d at 247. 
The principles announced in Lindbeck and Holbrook provided 
needed guidance for a "probable cause" determination under 
Article I, Section 14, of the Utah Constitution. At the very least, 
both decisions indicate that the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" 
standards remain strict prerequisites for establishing probable 
cause under the Utah Constitution. For the reasons stated 
previously in Point I and because of the more clearly defined and 
recognized protections afforded individuals under the Utah 
Constitution, Detective Powers' affidavit did not justify a finding 
of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. The 
warrant was invalid. 
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POINT III 
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE MUST BE SUPPRESSED, 
Since the "Affidavit For Search Warrant" was unlawful, tte 
evidence seized during the subsequent search should have been 
suppressed, "[E]xclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a 
necessary consequence of police violations of article I, section 11 
[of the Utah Constitution]." State v, Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 
(Utah 1990); cf. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 961 (1984) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("We cannot 
intelligibly assume, arguendo, that a search was constitutionally 
unreasonable but that the seized evidence is admissible because the 
same search was reasonable"); see supra note 7. 
CONCLUSION 
Ap>pellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse hi 3 
conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this [*f day of September, 1990. 
-<M-£ uhM/pj 
KAREN STAM 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
RONALD S.l FU, R \ JINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Unreasonable searches and seizures. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be vio-
lated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by-
oath or alBrmation, pariicularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the person or thing to be seized. 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
77-23-3. Conditions precedent to issuance. 
(1) A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause supported 
by oath or affirmation particularly describing the person or place to be 
searched and the person, property or evidence to be seized. J 
(2) If the item sought to be seized is evidence of illegal conduct and is in the 
possession of a person or entity for which there is insufficient probable cause 
shown to the magistrate to believe that such person or entity is a party to the 
alleged illegal conduct, no search warrant shall issue except upon a finding by 
the magistrate that the evidence sought to be seized cannot be obtained by 
subpoena or that such evidence would be concealed, destroyed, damaged, or 
altered if sought by subpoena. If such a finding is made and a search warrant 
issued, the magistrate shall direct upon the warrant such conditions that 
reasonably afford protection of the following interests of the person or entity 
in possession of such evidence: 
(a) Protection against unreasonable interference with normal business; 
or 
(b) Protection against the loss or disclosure of protected confidential 





" dirpcfc restraints on constitutionally pro-
ADDENDUM B 
AVID E. YOCOM 
ounty Attorney 
y: GREGORY G. SKORDAS 
eputy County Attorney 
ourtside Office Building 
31 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
ialt Lake City, Utah 84111 
>hone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: Sheila McCleve 450 South 2nd East 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he has reason to believe: 
That on the premises known as 1316 East 3900 South, the 
eastraost unit in a duplex located on 3900 South. The duplex is 
reddish-orange brick with a pink roof and a swamp cooler in the roof. 
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there 
is now certain property or evidence described as: 
^J^jTwo Ninetendo Games (brain and paddles); 
^ ^ n e Cosmo 5" TV Model CTV 701; 
^-N -Two Magnavox VCP Model #VR9602AT01; 
v^JJhOne Tote Vision VCP; 
5^r*0ne 9" Samsung TV; 
One 9" Sony TV; 
One Alpine AM/FM Cassette Car Stereo (black); 
CA\ -*k Panasonic Stereo AM/FM Cassette Car Stereo (black); 
VSJ ***Two Samsong VCP Model VP 2215'. 
(Continued on page 2) ^ ^t^w^ov*0! 
PAGE 2 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
and that said property or evidence: 
(x) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or 
(x) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or 
(x) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means 
of committing or concealing a public offense, or 
(x) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct, or 
(x) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to 
the illegal conduct. [Note requirements of Utah Coie 
Annotated, 77-23-3(2)]* 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above s 
evidence of the crime(s) of Burglary, Theft, Receiving Stolen 
Property. 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant 
are: 
Affiant, Leslie Kent Powers, is a detective with the Salt 
Lake County Sheriff's Office and has been such for 1 1/2 years. 
Affiant has been a deputy Salt Lake County Sheriff for 5 years. 
Affiant is currently assigned as a burglary detective assigned as 
such for the past 1 1/2 years with Salt Lake County. Affiant has ha 1 
extensive training with local law enforcement in the area of burglar^ 
investigation. 
Affiant has reviewed the report #89-42191 (Initial Report) ol 
Deputy Gary Curamings which alleges tht on or about May 7, 198$ 
someone entered into the east back building of DustyTs Vans at 340E 
South State in Salt Lake County through the east doors. Entry was 
made by prying a metal door. Joe Torres of Dusty1s Vans reports that 
the forced entry was made between 2300 hours on May 6, 1989 and 1025 
hours on May 7, 1989 and that the items listed above were removed 
from the building, valued at well over $1,000.00. 
Affiant has reviewed the report #89-42191 (follow-up report) 
of Deputy Sterner which alleges that the deputy interviewed Dave 
Torgerson of Dusty1s Vans who located two witresses to the 
above-referenced burglary. 
(Continued uu page 3) 
GE 3 
FIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
Affiant personally interviewed witnesses Jay Larance and 
nda Larance who stated that they were awakened at 700 hours on May 
1989 by someone who was jumping back and forth over a fence 
:tween her residence (apartment) and Dustyfs Vans. Both of these 
tnesses observed the man who then got into a blue Mitsubishi truck, 
.th a temporary sticker in the rear window. The man was identified 
> approximately 6' tall, in his 30Ts with short blonde hair wearing 
lorts and a black tank top. 
Affiant showed both witnesses a photospread including 
saver's picture and he was positively identified by both witnesses 
5 the man described above, observed climbing the fence to Dusty1s 
ans. 
Weaver is currently on Intense Supervised Parole for 
eceiving Stolen Property and is supervised by Sally Powell from the 
epartment of Corrections. Weaver resides at 1328 East 3900 South 
ith his grandmother. Weaver's mother resides at the house to be 
earched. 
Affiant has interviewed Ms. Powell who alleges that on May 
1, 1989, Weaver made numerous trips (5-6) between the houses and in 
act was at the house to be searched on the evening of May 10, 1989. 
Affiant alleges through his experience and belief that 
reaver, being on Intense Supervised Parole, would not keep stolen 
>roperty at his primary residence knowing that such a place could and 
s routinely searched by Parole Officers. Further, affiant alleges 
;hat there is probable cause, because of the above-mentioned 
zircumstances and Weaver's activity, to believe that the stolen 
>roperty sought to be seized is located at the property to be 
searched hereby. 
Such evidence would be cancealed, destroyed, damaged, or 
altered if sought by subpoena. A no-knock warrant is not reauested 
iere. It is reauested that the home be searched during regular hours 
Ln a manner least intrusive to other occupants. 
(Continued on page 4) 
PAGE 4 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the 
seizure of said items: 
(x) in the day time. 
AFFIANT 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this / ^ a y 1989. 
.RCU1T C6URT\ 
IN AND FOR 'SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH •':'- ..T ~. /.; 
lls/3445E 
/ID E. YOCOM 
jnty Attorney 
: GREGORY G. SKORDAS 
puty County Attorney 
urtside Office Building 
1 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
It Lake City, Utah 84111 
one: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
No. 
OUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
o any peace officer in the State of Utah. 
'roof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by 
)etective L. Powers - SLCSO, I am satisfied that there is probable 
zause to believe 
That on the premises known as 1316 East 3900 South, the 
sastraost unit in a duplex located on 3900 South. The duplex is 
reddish-orange brick with a pink roof and a swamp cooler in the roof. 
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there 
is now certain property or evidence .described as: 
Two Ninetendo Games (brain and paddles); 
One Cosmo 5" TV Model CTV 701; 
Two Magnavox VCP Model #VR9602AT01; 
One Tote Vision VCP; 
One 9t! Samsung TV; 
One 9" Sony TV; 
One Alpine AM/FM Cassette Car Stereo (black); 
Panasonic Stereo AM/FM Cassette Car Stereo (black); 
Two Sarasong VCP Model VP 2215. 
(Continued on page 2) 
PAGE 2 
SEARCH WARRANT 
and that said property or evidence: 
(x) was unlawfully acauired or is unlawfully possessed, or 
(x) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or 
(x) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a meais 
of committing or concealing a public offense, or 
(x) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegil 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct, or 
(x) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party 10 
the illegal conduct. [Note requirements of Utah Coce 
Annotated, 77-23-3(2)] 
You are therefore commanded: 
(x) in the day time 
to make a search of the above-named or described person(s), 
vehicle(s), and premises for the herein-above described property or 
evidence and if you find the same or any part thereof, to bring it 
forthwith before me at the Third Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to 
the order of this court, 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this / ^ d a y of Mayv.1989. 
JUDGE OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
lls/3445E 
RETURN TO SEARCH WARRANT 
NO. 
The personal property ( l i s t e d below/set out on the inventory 
:tached hereto) was taken from the premises located and described 
5
 VMl»LVtoO S O 
nd from the vehicle(s) described as tO/A-
nd from the person(s) of Hi A 
y virtue of a search warrant dated the ) 2. day of lPP\OiVf 
md executed by Judge 
>f the above-entitled court: 
I, Wo<^rVQ\J^XJU&* * by whom this warrant was executed, 
io swear that the (above/attached) inventory contains a true and 
detailed account of all the property taken by me under the warrant, 
on 
All of the property taken by virtue of said warrant will 
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